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INTRODUCTION
For decades, the collateral source rule has been a target of tort re1
form on both state and national levels. The rule, which at common
law prohibits the introduction of evidence regarding collateral pay2
ments received by the claimant in a suit for damages, has sparked a
long-standing debate. Its proponents cite its potential to align the
costs of injury with tortfeasors and to deter tortious conduct, while its
opponents claim that the rule results in double recovery for claimants
and inflated insurance costs. The result of this debate has been varied
treatment of the rule, with some states following the common law
3
rule, some limiting its application, and some abrogating it in full. Calls
for tort reform have been widely influential throughout the states. Most
states have already limited or abrogated the rule, and it is possible that
4
other states as well as the federal government may follow suit.
The application of the collateral source rule has become more
complicated since the passage of the Patient Protection and Afforda5
ble Care Act, which contains a provision establishing an individual
6
mandate to obtain health insurance. While the insured plaintiff may
have benefitted from the collateral source rule before the Affordable
1

See, e.g., James L. Branton, The Collateral Source Rule, 18 ST. MARY’S L.J. 883, 88789 (1987); Amanda Edwards, Recent Developments, Medical Malpractice Non-Economic
Damages Caps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEG. 213, 213-14 (2006) (explaining proposed federal
tort reform bills that included measures to repeal the collateral source rule).
2
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979) (“Payments made to or
benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the
tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.”).
3
See infra notes 21-23.
4
See, e.g., H.R. 5, 112th Cong. § 6 (2011) (“In any health care lawsuit involving injury
or wrongful death, any party may introduce evidence of collateral source benefits.”).
5
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act), Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21,
25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
6
Id. § 1501(a)–(b), 28 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a)–(b) (West Supp. 2011), invalidated in
part by Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 125 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, No. 11-0398, 2011 WL 5515164 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011).
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Care Act was passed, now an uninsured claimant may benefit under
7
the rule. Under the common law collateral source rule, evidence that
a plaintiff has chosen to shirk his obligation to purchase insurance
8
must be excluded. The rule’s ban of insurance evidence may have
the result of protecting—as opposed to penalizing—uninsured claimants. The decision to forgo insurance that may have covered the uninsured claimants’ medical expenses is hidden from the jury, whose
members presumably have complied with the mandate. Under the
new health care law, both insured and uninsured plaintiffs stand to
gain from the use of the collateral source rule. This outcome may
provide an additional incentive for states and the federal government
to limit or change the common law rule.
Although commentators have put forth many arguments both
supporting and opposing the use of the collateral source rule, they
have proposed fewer models for its revision. This Comment will provide a model for updating and partially abrogating the collateral
source rule in personal injury cases. It will examine the effect that the
model will have on the outcome of these cases and the fulfillment of
new policy goals in the wake of health care reform. Part I will explain
the current state of the collateral source rule and will provide an overview of how it has been changed across the states. Part II will summarize the debate surrounding the elimination of the rule. Part III will
address how the Affordable Care Act has changed this debate. Part IV
will evaluate the consequences of modifying the collateral source rule
in personal injury cases. Finally, Part V will provide a model for limiting the rule.
I. CURRENT ROLE OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
The common law collateral source rule prohibits reducing the
amount of damages that an injured claimant is entitled to receive
from the tortfeasor as compensation for reasonable medical expens9
es. The rule therefore bars the introduction of evidence that a col7

This Comment deals solely with the Affordable Care Act as passed. The constitutionality of the individual mandate is outside the scope of this Comment, which assumes that Affordable Care Act will take effect as planned on January 1, 2014, with the
individual mandate left intact.
8
Some versions of the collateral source rule expressly forbid the introduction of
evidence demonstrating that the claimant lacks insurance under certain circumstances. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 411.
9
See, e.g., Rodgers v. Boynton, 52 N.E.2d 576, 577 (Mass. 1943) (asserting that the
only relevant “measure of damages is fair compensation for the injury sustained”);

LEVENSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

924

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

2/15/2012 7:11 PM

[Vol. 160: 921
10

lateral source, such as an insurer, paid these expenses for a claimant.
Though the precise definition of “collateral source” varies from state
to state, it is generally accepted that a collateral benefit is any form of
payment provided by a source other than the tortfeasor that repairs
11
the claimant’s injury. These sources can include health insurance,
automobile accident insurance, disability payments, worker’s compensation, and other programs and agreements that provide or pay for
12
medical or other related expenses. Payments made to the claimant
by the tortfeasor, on the other hand, are admissible at trial and are
13
credited to the tortfeasor in the computation of damages.
At trial, the collateral source rule plays both a substantive and an
14
evidentiary role. The evidentiary function of the rule is to determine
what evidence pertaining to collateral sources may be introduced at
trial for the jury to consider when deciding the defendant tortfeasor’s
liability. That is, it governs the question of whether the fact that the
claimant was insured can be considered in determining if the defendant is at fault. The common law collateral source rule prevents the
defendant from presenting evidence that the claimant possessed in-

Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 229 P.3d 893, 899 n.8 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010)
(“The collateral source rule is the ‘well settled rule in tort actions that a party has a
cause of action notwithstanding the payment of his loss by an insurance company.’”
(quoting Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 640 n.4 (Wash. 1998) (en banc))), pet. granted,
249 P.3d 624 (Wash. 2010) (unpublished table decision).
10
As the Federal Rules of Evidence state,
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible
upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership,
or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
FED. R. EVID. 411. Collateral sources are defined slightly differently across the states,
but all states include medical insurance within their definitions.
11
See, e.g., Reed v. Nat’l Council of Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 180,
194 (D.N.H. 2010) (“[T]he rule ‘does not differentiate between the nature of the benefits [paid to the claimant as a result of his injuries] so long as they did not come from
the defendant or a person acting for him.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 920A cmt. b, at 514 (1979))).
12
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(2)(a) (West 2005).
13
Cf. Richard C. Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages,
46 MINN. L. REV. 669, 670-71 (1962) (explaining that the collateral source rule extends
to reparations paid by sources other than the wrongdoer).
14
See, e.g., Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 2010) (“[T]he collateral
source rule has both a substantive aspect that relates to the law of damages, and an evidentiary component that governs what types of evidence may be admitted in evidence
at trial.” (citing Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 202-03 (Mass. 1974))).
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15

surance to the jury before the verdict. Some state statutes allow the
16
defendant to do so in some or all circumstances. The rule does not
prevent the claimant from introducing evidence regarding his insurance coverage.
The substantive, or damages, function governs whether a claimant’s damages may include expenses already covered by a collateral
17
source. Once the jury has returned a verdict and a damages award,
some states allow the amount the claimant received from the collat18
eral source to be subtracted from the award.
19
Every state and federal court has adopted the collateral source
20
rule in some form. Presently, many states have acquiesced to the
demands of tort reform movements by limiting the reach of the col-

15

Federal Rule of Evidence 411 adopts the common law prohibition on admitting
insurance evidence to the jury.
16
See infra note 21.
17
See infra note 21. The federal rule bars the introduction of evidence of collateral source payments for both evidentiary and substantive purposes. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A. But see Quintero v. United States, No. 08-1890, 2010 WL
5071045, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (concluding that the admission of collateral
evidence is acceptable under the Federal Rules of Evidence when substantive probative
value outweighs prejudice). State courts differ in their use of the collateral source
rule. Some ban collateral source evidence outright, some use the rule for its evidentiary function during trial, and some allow collateral source information in its evidentiary and substantive forms. Compare Myers v. Beem, 712 P.2d 1092, 1093 (Colo. App.
1985) (“[E]vidence of compensation from a collateral source is inadmissible, because
it is irrelevant.” (citing COLO. R. EVID. 401)), with ALA. CODE § 12-21-45 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2007), and Dyet v. McKinley, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 2003) (“Evidence of
payment by collateral sources is admissible to the court after the finder of fact has rendered an award. Such award shall be reduced by the court to the extent the award includes compensation for damages, which have been compensated independently from
collateral sources.” (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
18
For states that allow for the subtraction of collateral source payments from
awards, see infra note 21, which lists states that allow for subtraction in some cases, and
infra note 22, which lists states that allow for the subtraction in all cases.
19
Many federal courts adhere to Federal Rule of Evidence 411 to determine the
collateral source rule’s evidentiary role in a case. However, they differ as to whether
the state or federal rule should be used to compute damages. Compare Sims v. Great
Am. Life Ins. Co., 469 F.3d 870, 884 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Federal Rules
of Evidence “exclusively govern in federal diversity cases”), and Craig v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 866 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (holding that the Alabama statute
concerning collateral sources governs only Alabama state courts, and thus applying the
federal rule to bar information concerning collateral sources (citing Killian v. Melser,
792 F. Supp. 1217, 1218 (N.D. Ala. 1992))), with Shelley v. White, 711 F. Supp. 2d
1295, 1297 n.1 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (rejecting Craig and Killian and determining that Alabama’s collateral source rule applies in full to diversity cases).
20
See infra notes 21-23.
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lateral source rule or abrogating it in full. In some state courts, as
24
well as in federal courts, the rule remains intact. As a result of the
21

Several states have modified the collateral source rule in limited circumstances
or for certain types of cases only. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.070, 09.55.560 (2008) (allowing collateral source information only post-verdict); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565
(Supp. 2008) (permitting collateral source evidence in medical malpractice cases only); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 2009) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21111.6 (1996) (post-verdict); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-225a–c (West Supp. 2009)
(post-verdict); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (Supp. 2008) (medical malpractice only); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 2009) (post-verdict); HAW. REV. STAT. § 66310 (Supp. 2007) (post-verdict); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (Supp. 2008) (postverdict); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1205 (West Supp. 2009) (post-verdict); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906 (Supp. 2008) (post-verdict); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-2A-09 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) (post-verdict); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231,
§ 60G (West Supp. 2009) (post-verdict); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303 (West
Supp. 2009) (post-verdict); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.251 (West Supp. 2008); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (2007) (post-verdict); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (2004) (postverdict); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2011) (post-verdict but preempted with regard to ERISA claims); N.Y. C.P.L.R 4545 (McKinney Supp. 2011) (post-verdict); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 (2010) (post-verdict); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.580 (2007) (postverdict); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-9-34.1 (2010) (reform applies to medical malpractice
cases only; held unconstitutional by an unreported Superior Court opinion); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-12 (2004) (medical malpractice only); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119
(2000) (medical malpractice only); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-405 (LexisNexis 2008)
(post-verdict in medical malpractice cases only); WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2009) (reform
applies to medical malpractice cases only).
States that have limited the rule solely post-verdict have eliminated the collateral
source rule for damages universally, allowing courts to subtract the claimant’s previous
collateral source payment from the total award. States that have limited the abrogation of the rule to medical malpractice cases—but that have opted not to do so postverdict for other cases—have eliminated the collateral source rule in its damages and
evidentiary roles only for medical malpractice actions.
22
Several states have altered the collateral source rule in all personal injury actions as both a rule of evidence and a rule of damages. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-545, 1221-45 (LexisNexis 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 147.136, 668.14 (West 1998); MO. REV. STAT. § 490.715 (West 2010) (evidence of
collateral payment may be presented, but not of collateral source); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2315.20 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708 (West 2004); 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1303.508 (West Supp. 2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 41.0105 (West Supp. 2009) (Texas courts have not yet specified whether the rule applies only post-verdict); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 557B-9a (West 2010).
23
Many states have refused to change the rule, and some courts have overturned
modifications to the collateral source rule as unconstitutional. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-35 (2007); Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, 308 S.W.3d 135, 137 (Ark. 2009);
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts, 434 S.E.2d 450, 451 n.1 (Ga. 1993);
Martinez v. Milburn Enters., Inc., 233 P.3d 205, 208-09 (Kan. 2010); Leighton v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 338 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011); Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans
Levee Dist. v. Mandry, 40 So. 3d 500, 502 (La. Ct. App. 2009); Cyr v. J.I. Case Co., 652
A.2d 685, 688 (N.H. 1994); Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Coop., Inc., 255
P.3d 324, 359 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011); Proctor v. Castalletti, 911 P.2d 853, 854 (Nev.
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wide disparity in the application of the rule across states and federal
courts, claimants in different courts can expect widely different out25
comes. Since the law remains unsettled as to whether the collateral
source rule is procedural or substantive, the discrepancies between
the rule in different jurisdictions promote varying outcomes in federal
26
diversity cases as well.
The differences among state collateral source rules reflect the divisiveness in the debate over the need for the collateral source rule, as
well as states’ differing reactions to numerous calls for tort reform.
However, the academic debate over the rule has concentrated much
more closely on the theoretical underpinnings of tort law.
II. TRADITIONAL DEBATE OVER THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
27

Originally, courts justified the collateral source rule as a means
28
of promoting tort deterrence and ensuring that a defendant tortfeasor would not benefit from the injured claimant’s insurance cover-

1996); McGee v. River Region Med. Ctr., 59 So. 3d 575, 581 (Miss. 2011); Wright v. Hiester Const. Co., 698 S.E.2d 822, 827 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010); Windsor Sch. Dist. v. State,
956 A.2d 528, 542 (Vt. 2008); Miller v. Campbell Cnty., 901 P.2d 1107 (Wyo. 1995).
Washington, D.C. also follows the common law collateral source rule. See Snowder v.
District of Columbia, 949 A.2d 590, 602 n.2 (D.C. 2008) (“The collateral source rule
provides . . . that an injured party may recover full compensation damages regardless of
the payment of any amount of those damages by an independent party . . . .”).
24
In federal cases, courts use the common law collateral source rule. See, e.g., Gill
v. Maciejewski, 546 F.3d 557, 565 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen § 1983 plaintiffs seek damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th
Cir. 1998) (allowing for widely different outcomes between state and federal courts in
§ 1983 actions).
25
See Nora J. Pasman-Green & Ronald D. Richards, Jr., Who is Winning the Collateral
Source Rule War? The Battleground in the Sixth Circuit States, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 425, 43043 (2000) (detailing the differences between the collateral source rules of states in the
Sixth Circuit).
26
For divergent federal court interpretations of how the collateral source rule
should be applied, for example, in Alabama, compare Shelley v. White, 711 F. Supp. 2d
1295, 1297 (M.D. Ala. 2010), with Killian v. Melser, 792 F. Supp. 1217, 1218 (N.D. Ala.
1992), and Craig v. F.W. Woolworth, 866 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
27
Some credit The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854),
with the introduction of the collateral source rule to United States courts. See, e.g.,
Pasman-Green & Richards, supra note 25, at 427 & n.16.
28
U.S. Can Co. v. N.L.R.B., 254 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The idea behind
the collateral-benefits doctrine, which originated in tort law, is damages measured by
the injury are essential to deterrence.”).
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29

age. Some scholars, including John Fleming, note that the rule was
more applicable at the time it was adopted, given the relative unavail30
ability of collateral source coverage during the nineteenth century.
However, more frequently critics debate the rule’s success in promoting the theory and policy of tort law. Traditionally, there has been little disagreement or discussion about the uninsured claimant who is
entitled to the costs of his medical expenses from the tortfeasor because the claimant has no collateral source to cover the costs of care.
Insurance law has not changed in any way that materially would alter
the scope of the debate, and so the dialogue has effectively reached a
standstill—both sides have focused almost exclusively on the value of
allowing the insured claimant to recover from the tortfeasor despite
31
the claimant’s insurance coverage.
Before the Affordable Care Act, the debate over the collateral
source rule had effectively reached equilibrium with different states
persuaded by each side. Aside from changes in the public perception
of the insurance industry and in the industry’s practices with regard to
subrogation and increased coverage, the collateral source rule debate
remained largely the same as it was decades ago. Fundamentally, the
disagreement about the prevalence and use of the collateral source
rule centers on the purpose of tort law, as well as the determination of
which party is entitled to the costs imposed by the tortfeasor and covered by the claimant’s insurance. This Section lays out the debate
over the collateral source rule as it stood before the Affordable Care
Act’s passage mandated individuals’ acquisition of medical insurance
coverage.
A. Arguments Supporting the Collateral Source Rule
Proponents of the rule defend it on several grounds. Advocates
for the deterrent purpose of tort law are particularly protective of the
collateral source rule. They assert that it is fundamental to tort law for
32
tortfeasors to pay for the consequences of their actions, and that the
29

Monticello, 58 U.S. at 155 (“[T]he wrongdoer . . . is bound to make satisfaction
for the injury he has done.”).
30
John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 1478, 1478-82 (1966).
31
See infra note 49.
32
See, e.g., Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 131-32 (Mass. 2010) (declaring that full
payment by tortfeasors to claimants furthers deterrence); Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis.
v. Cleveland, 369 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (“The policy of Wisconsin’s
tort law is to provide full compensation to persons who are injured by negligent con-
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deterrent effect of tort law is undermined when a claimant’s medical
33
expenses are covered by his own insurance. Furthermore, proponents argue, a tortfeasor in a personal injury action without the collateral source rule should not receive a windfall of lesser or no damages because the claimant in the action received benefits from a
34
collateral source.
Some defend the collateral source rule because of the practical
outcome of many personal injury cases. They argue that collateral
sources never pay the full costs of recovery to the plaintiff, as the costs
of obtaining insurance, the deductible, and attorneys’ fees are often
35
not reimbursed by the collateral source. Therefore, it is important
that the defendant pay full damages to make up for the claimant’s
other out-of-pocket expenses related to the injury and the consequent
litigation. Alternatively, the collateral source rule can be justified as a
36
reward for a claimant’s investment in insurance. This “benefit of the
37
bargain” argument credits the collateral source rule for providing
duct and to deter such conduct by imposing the full monetary consequences on the
tortfeasor.” (citing Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664, 674-75 (Wis. 1967))); Michael I.
Krauss & Jeremy Kidd, Collateral Source and Tort’s Soul, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 22
(2009) (advocating for the collateral source rule in terms of corrective justice).
33
See Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in America: Abrograting the Collateral Source
Rule Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346, 348 (2008) (citing F. Patrick Hubbard, The
Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 485 (2006)).
34
Fleming, supra note 30, at 1483 (“To anyone a little troubled by the notion that
[the rule] might mean double recovery for the plaintiff, the stereotyped response has
been that this is still better than letting the defendant profit . . . .” (citing Gypsum Carriers v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525, 534 (9th Cir. 1962); Dodds v. Bucknum, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 393, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963))).
35
See id. (“[I]n any event, the damages awarded to a plaintiff at least in personal
actions never fully indemnify him for his loss, especially when account is taken of the
fact that a large slice of it will find its way into the pocket of his attorney.”).
36
See Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66 (Cal. 1970) (noting
that the collateral source rule ensures “that a person who has invested years of insurance premiums to assure his medical care . . . receives the benefits of his thrift,” while
allowing the plaintiff’s insurance to mitigate a tortfeasor’s damages would put the
plaintiff “in a position inferior to that of having bought no insurance, because his
payment of premiums would have earned no benefit”).
37
See Joel K. Jacobsen, The Collateral Source Rule and the Role of the Jury, 70 OR. L.
REV. 523, 531-34 (1991) (explaining the benefit-of-the-bargain argument in favor of
the collateral source rule); see also Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 322-23 (Va.
2000) (“The portions of medical expenses that health care providers write off constitute ‘compensation or indemnity received by a tort victim from a source collateral to
the tortfeasor . . . .’” (quoting Schickling v. Aspinall, 369 S.E.2d 172, 174 (Va. 1988))).
But see Martinez v. Milburn Enters., Inc., 233 P.3d 205, 220-21 (Kan. 2010) (rejecting
the use of the benefit-of-the-bargain approach, as it allows privately insured claimants
to receive write-offs for their medical expenses as part of damages while Medicare recipients cannot).

LEVENSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

930

2/15/2012 7:11 PM

[Vol. 160: 921

incentives for individuals to internalize the costs of their own medical
38
coverage by purchasing medical insurance. One way that states with
limitations on their collateral source rules ensure that claimants recover an equitable amount of damages despite the reduction for collateral source benefits they receive is through make-whole rules, which ensure that the award is not reduced for collateral benefits until the
39
claimant receives some of the costs of procuring the collateral benefit.
Lastly, proponents of the rule argue that the collateral source rule
rarely results in double recovery because of the subrogation rights retained in primary insurance contracts and enforced by many insur40
ance companies. These rights allow insurers to deduct their costs for
the claimant’s care from the damages that the claimant receives from
41
a tortfeasor if these costs are recovered in litigation. The insurers
may either bring a suit against the defendant or the defendant’s in-

38

Christian D. Saine, Note, Preserving the Collateral Source Rule: Modern Theories of
Tort Law and a Proposal for Practical Application, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1075, 1078
(1997) (“Since the insurance company has already been paid premiums to bear an actuarial risk, the benefit payments it must make are simply a cost of doing business that
has already been contracted and paid for by the plaintiff.”).
39
Florida, for example, limits the rule in the following way:
[T]he court shall reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts
which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant . . . from all collateral
sources . . . . Such reduction shall be offset to the extent of any amount which
has been paid [by] the claimant . . . to secure her or his right to any collateral
source benefit which the claimant is receiving . . . .
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 2009).
40
See Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepard, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, 50 J.L.
& ECON. 221, 231 (2007) (asserting that the collateral source rule will not lead to double recovery because the damages are reduced only by the plaintiff’s recovery from
other sources).
41
See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 3.10(a)(1)
(student’s ed. 1988). However, subrogation rights, or a subtraction from the award for
collateral benefits, may be reduced to take into account a claimant’s costs, which may
include some legal costs. In cases of settlements, reductions may be made in proportion to the reduced award accepted by the claimant. See Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, the Contingency Fee System, Juries, and Social Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1259-60 (2005) (discussing how plaintiffs’ lawyers in
Wisconsin negotiate agreements with insurers to limit subrogation rights so that it is
affordable to undertake lawsuits).
In some cases, subrogation can result in reductions from noneconomic as well as
economic damages because, after the legal fees and costs of the suit, the claimant’s
economic damages may not satisfy the subrogation agreement. See Gregory Pitts,
Comment, E.R.I.S.A. Subrogation as Interpreted Within the Seventh Circuit—A Roadmap for
Managing First Dollar Recovery, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 765, 769-70 (2002).
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42

surer on its own behalf or claim a right to a portion of the claimant’s
43
winnings. An insurer’s exercise of its subrogation rights reduces the
44
claimant’s capacity for double recovery for covered costs.
Proponents of the collateral source rule are concerned that its
modification or repeal would also have an effect on the independence
of jury determinations. This group worries that juries would look unfavorably upon insured claimants suing tortfeasors for recovery of
costs already paid by a collateral source, regardless of whether the recovery would be subrogated to the insurer or retained by the claim45
ant. The argument follows that the collateral source rule promotes
jury determinations independent of a potentially prejudicial inquiry as
46
to whether or not the plaintiff had insurance.
B. Arguments Opposing the Collateral Source Rule
Opponents of the collateral source rule, however, reject these arguments as out of touch with reality. Stemming from a fundamental
47
belief that the purpose of tort law is not deterrence but rather compensation for harm, the central objection for opponents of the collateral source rule is the possibility that claimants may recover twice for
48
their injuries: once from a primary insurer and again from the tort-

42

The insurer must return to the victim any award it receives in excess of the victim’s covered medical expenses. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW 235 (1987).
43
See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 41, § 3.10(b)(1).
44
See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368 (2006) (holding that
a health insurer covered by ERISA may enforce its subrogation right).
45
See Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform’s Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS
L.J. 835, 861 (2002) (citing studies that suggest that juries have reacted to antitort public relations campaigns by limiting verdicts).
46
Id. However, studies have shown that despite the existence of the collateral
source rule, juries speculate on insurance in deliberations on liability and awards. See,
e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics,
87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1875-95 (2001) (finding that conversations about insurance occurred in the jury room in eighty-five percent of all cases in the study).
47
See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-87 (1994) (collecting arguments from authors
who doubt the deterrent effect of tort liability).
48
I refer to both first-party and liability (third-party) insurance throughout this
Comment. Put simply, a first-party medical insurance policy will pay some of the policy
holder’s medical costs. A third-party liability insurer generally pays at least some of the
costs due to a claimant when the policyholder is found liable in the claimant’s suit
against him.
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49

feasor. For those opponents who view the purpose of tort law as solely
compensatory, the collateral source rule seems to facilitate the payment
50
of additional punitive damages. These opponents argue that subrogation does not justify the use of the rule, as insurers do not always pur51
sue subrogation rights because of the expense of recovering awards.
Further, medical write-offs can also allow for inflated awards. Collateral sources often do not pay for medical services at full price, al52
lowing an insured claimant to receive medical care at a reduced rate.
Under the collateral source rule, claimants are able to collect the
write-off—the difference between the actual cost and the reasonable

49

Steven B. Hantler et al., Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 21, 26 (2005); see also Hubbard, supra note 33, at 485.
50
See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Contract Damages, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 56, 58-59 (1983) (arguing that justifying the collateral source rule because of its
ability to punish the tortfeasor is incompatible with the exclusive purpose of tort law—
victim compensation—and noting that punitive damages in these cases may be restricted through statutes and common law). At least two federal circuit courts have
rejected this rationale in the context of Federal Tort Claims Act litigation. See Siverson
v. United States, 710 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that this justification
“would essentially always find recovery from a collateral source to be ‘punitive’ and ignores the collateral source doctrine’s purpose of preventing a windfall to the defendant”); Smith v. United States, 587 F.2d 1013, 1017 (3rd Cir. 1978) (“Were we to adopt
the government’s position we would deprive a victim of benefits—which he has paid
for out of his own wages—merely because he had the misfortune to have been injured
by the United States rather than by a private tortfeasor.”).
51
Cf. Hubbard, supra note 33, at 486 (“[S]ubrogation involves additional administrative costs because shifting the tort payment from the plaintiff to the provider entails
time and expense as the plaintiff and provider determine the rights of the provider.”
(citing Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 65 n.8, 67-68 (1970))).
52
Medical bills admissible at trial do not necessarily reflect the amount paid by the
insurer. See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Mass. 2010) (“The only patients actually paying the stated charges are the uninsured, a small fraction of medical bill
payors.”); Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts,
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 661-63 (2008) (characterizing
the difference between rates paid by the insured and uninsured patients as “eyepopping”); James McGrath, Overcharging the Uninsured in Hospitals: Shifting a Greater
Share of Uncompensated Medical Care Costs to the Federal Government, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
173, 184-85 (2007) (asserting that only the uninsured pay the hospital’s list price because insurance providers have usually negotiated discounts); see also Stanley v. Walker,
906 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2009) (“The complexities of health care pricing structures
make it difficult to determine whether the amount paid, the amount billed, or an
amount in between represents the reasonable value of medical services.”). The justification for this discrepancy is that the defendant should not benefit from the deals the
claimant’s insurer makes with its providers. See Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 704
(La. 2004) (embracing the benefit-of-the-bargain approach to allow claimants to recover
the full value of their medical expenses, including the amount that was written off).
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53

cost of the care paid by the collateral source. States allow claimants
to collect write-offs under the collateral source rule because disclosure
of the reduced payment often suggests that a collateral source paid for
these expenses, undermining the purpose of keeping this information
54
from the jury.
As a result of double payments and inflated awards, opponents
blame the collateral source rule for increasing insurance payments
55
and encouraging claimants to go to trial. This argument has led to
the modification or abrogation of the rule in many states in response
56
to calls for tort reform.
Until now, this debate has driven state and federal decisions to either maintain or limit the collateral source rule. Legislatures that
were persuaded by the tort reform argument passed legislation limit57
ing the rule, whereas those for which the deterrent value of the rule
58
59
prevails have retained it.
53

See, e.g., Michael K. Beard, The Impact of Changes in Health Care Provider Reimbursement Systems on the Recovery of Damages for Medical Expenses in Personal Injury Suits, 21
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 453, 476-77 (1998) (explaining that many courts treat write-offs as
a collateral source benefit).
54
See, e.g., Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1030 (Ill. 2008) (holding that a claimant is entitled to the reasonable value of his medical expenses, not only those paid by
an insurer); see also Swanson v. Brewster, 784 N.W.2d 264, 281-82 (Minn. 2010) (citing
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.251, subdiv. 5 (West Supp. 2008)) (noting inadmissible evidence showing that an insurer paid less than the billed amount).
55
See, e.g., Krauss & Kidd, supra note 32, at 11-12 (noting that critics of the collateral source rule argue that the rule increases both insurance premiums and litigation
costs because it encourages needless litigation (citing Pasman-Green & Richards, supra
note 25, at 429-30)).
56
See supra notes 21-22; see also Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program:
What Its Effect Would Be on American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
1339, 1341 (1994) (“As part of tort reform, the collateral source rule has by now been
abolished in several states.”).
57
See, e.g., Jonathan J. Lewis, Putting MICRA Under the Microscope: The Case for Repealing California Civil Code Section 3333.1(a), 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 174-78 (2001)
(detailing California’s partial repeal of the collateral source rule in hopes of addressing escalating medical malpractice insurance rates in the mid-1970s).
58
While courts have struck down many tort reform efforts as unconstitutional,
some legislatures have managed to satisfy their courts by narrowly tailoring the rule.
See Kara Lee Monahan, Comment, State Constitutional Law—Tort Reform—Supreme Court
of Ohio Reverses Course and Upholds Limits on Noneconomic and Punitive Damages as Constitutional, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 953, 956-60 (2009) (reviewing the history of the Ohio Supreme Court overturning legislative efforts on tort reform and the court’s later acceptance of noneconomic and punitive damages limitations). The court in Arbino v.
Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio 2007), did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of abrogating the collateral source rule, a measure that has been struck
down by the Ohio Supreme Court multiple times. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of
Trial Lawyers v. Sherward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1102-03 (Ohio 1999) (striking down the
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Both sides present persuasive arguments. Rewarding individuals
for choosing to purchase health insurance makes sense in a world in
which insurance is not required, yet the increasing number of defendants with liability insurance seems to undermine the deterrence justification for the rule. Accordingly, neither side of the traditional debate
is fully persuasive in justifying either a universal return to the collateral
source rule or its abrogation. However, the recent health care reform
legislation has introduced a new issue that changes the scope and persuasiveness of each side of the debate: the uninsured claimant.
III. INTRODUCING THE ISSUE OF THE UNINSURED CLAIMANT: HOW THE
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE CHANGES THE SCOPE OF THE
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE DEBATE
The Affordable Care Act mandates the acquisition of insurance
coverage by most Americans, and, in so doing, undermines the justifications for maintaining the collateral source rule, especially because
the rule would now benefit uninsured individuals who shirk their obligations to obtain insurance under the Affordable Care Act. The Affordable Care Act’s purpose is to improve and extend insurance cov60
erage to nearly all Americans. Central to this effort is the individual
mandate—the requirement that all nonexempt individuals obtain
61
62
All included individuals
“minimum essential coverage” by 2014.

repeal of the collateral source rule for violating separation of powers); Sorrell v.
Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 510 (Ohio 1994) (striking down the repeal of the collateral
source rule for violating the right to trial by jury), superseded by statute, 2002 Ohio Laws
File 250.
59
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35 (2007) (codifying the common law collateral
source rule).
60
The Act seeks to provide coverage for an additional thirty-two million Americans. See John D. Goodson, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Promise and Peril for
Primary Care, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 742, 742 (2010); see also Scott E. Harrington,
U.S. Health-Care Reform: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 J. RISK & INS.
703, 704 (2010) (listing the ways in which the Affordable Care Act will expand insurance coverage “by (1) requiring individuals to obtain health insurance, (2) subsidizing
the cost of insurance for low- and moderate-income persons, (3) requiring employers
above a certain size to offer health coverage to employees, and (4) significantly expanding eligibility for Medicaid”).
61
Affordable Care Act sec. 1501(b), § 5000A, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b) (West Supp.
2011) (“An applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure
that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.”).
62
The Affordable Care Act contains exemptions for religious reasons, individuals
not lawfully present in the United States, incarcerated individuals, and individuals who
cannot afford insurance. Id. sec. 1501(b), § 5000A, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)–(e).
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who are noncompliant with the mandate must pay a monthly penalty
64
for their failure to contribute to the system. This section explains the
effect of the statute on the justifications for the collateral source rule.
Mandated health insurance changes the collateral source rule
equation. Because the rule is meant in part to hide whether or not
the claimant is insured to uphold the defendant’s liability and protect
insured plaintiffs, the rule has less effect in an age when juries may
65
well assume that the claimants have insurance. The insurance mandate of the Affordable Care Act will further undermine the rule’s abil66
ity to hide a claimant’s insured status. If juries currently make as67
sumptions about a claimants’ coverage, expanded coverage under
the Affordable Care Act will further support a jury’s assumption that a
claimant is insured.
A weightier concern is that now not only is it controversial for insured claimants to recover full damages for their losses despite their
coverage, but also, under the Affordable Care Act, willfully uninsured
68
claimants would receive full damages despite their failure to opt in to
a mandatory insurance system that could have mitigated the damages
that the tortfeasor would have to pay. As passed, the Affordable Care
Act imposes a penalty on willfully uninsured individuals, illustrating
that it intends the individual procurement of medical insurance coverage to be required. The mandate is a conscious effort to spread

63

Id. sec. 10106(b)(1), § 5000A, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b) (“If a taxpayer who is an
applicable individual . . . fails to meet the requirement of [maintaining minimum essential coverage] . . . , there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty with respect
to such failures . . . .”).
64
In addition to aligning the collateral source rule with the Affordable Care Act’s
philosophy, changing the collateral source rule may act as an enhanced deterrent for
individuals to shirk their responsibility under the individual mandate.
65
See supra text accompanying note 30.
66
It is estimated that between twenty-one and twenty-three million people, including illegal immigrants, will remain uninsured under the Affordable Care Act. See Harrington, supra note 60, at 704 n.2; Mitchell H. Katz, Future of the Safety Net Under Health
Reform, 304 JAMA 679, 679 (citing Office of the Actuary, Cntrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Services estimate). It is projected that about four million nonelderly people will
remain willfully uninsured in 2016. Harrington, supra note 60, at 704 n.2.
67
See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 46, at 1889 (contrasting concerns with overcompensating plaintiffs with “traditional assumptions about the role of insurance in
juror thinking”).
68
I use “willfully uninsured” to distinguish those who ignore the Affordable Care
Act mandate from individuals who are exempt from obtaining coverage under the
statute. See supra note 62. For the purpose of this Comment, “willfully uninsured” refers to individuals who have the obligation to obtain coverage but refuse to do so.
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costs among individuals to reduce premiums and health care costs.
Willfully uninsured individuals subvert this purpose.
With the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the collateral source
rule allows willfully uninsured claimants to hide their lack of health
coverage during trial and during the calculation of damages. Though
proponents of the rule argue that a defendant should not benefit
70
from a claimant’s decision to purchase insurance, the states and the
federal government may decide that because purchasing insurance is
now mandatory, rewarding the decision is less important. In addition,
rewarding willfully uninsured claimants with full damages for their
decisions to forgo coverage is less justifiable.
Thus, the collateral source rule is less defensible as applied to either insured or willfully uninsured plaintiffs. The Affordable Care Act
provides an additional and substantial reason to favor changing the
rule. Updating the collateral source rule to align with the goals of the
Affordable Care Act—specifically to dissuade individuals from refusing to obtain insurance coverage and to ensure that willfully uninsured individuals do not receive damages that an insurance plan otherwise would have covered—reinforces the Affordable Care Act’s
message and provides an opportunity for tort reform consistent with
the Act. This measure may have the effect of providing an additional
deterrent to nonexempt individuals deciding to forgo health insurance coverage. At the very least, the new issue of the uninsured
claimant changes the weight of the arguments fundamental to the
traditional collateral source rule debate.
IV. THE EFFECT OF MODIFYING THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
IN THE WAKE OF HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM
In light of the Affordable Care Act, arguments for upholding the
common law collateral source rule are no longer as persuasive as they
were before. Whether or not changes to the collateral source rule will
be made in the wake of the Affordable Care Act will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, to evaluate this choice and determine
how the rule should be changed, a number of factors must be considered to evaluate the effect that such a limitation may have on the existing tort regime. This Part highlights a number of these factors and

69

See infra note 84.
See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 751 (Ariz. 1977) (offering a rationale for the collateral source rule).
70
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evaluates the consequences that changes to the collateral source rule
may have for each.
A. Political Benefits
Long a target of calls for tort reform, critics often blame the collateral source rule for driving up insurance costs as well as the costs of
71
both litigation and settlement. Limiting the collateral source rule’s
application in certain circumstances may be a low-cost means of pleasing big businesses, people in the medical profession, individuals who
purchase their own liability insurance coverage, and others who are
72
looking for government intervention to reduce premiums. On the
federal level, a limited abrogation of the collateral source rule meant
to decrease damages in connection with the Affordable Care Act may
produce some goodwill from groups who are more likely to oppose
the mandate, while also promoting the policy objective of incentivizing individuals to purchase coverage. However, it does not make
good political sense to eliminate the rule outright. Collateral source
rule statutes must have protections for those exempt from the individual mandate, those subject to mandatory subrogation agreements,
and those who otherwise would be denied a sufficient recovery. The
following Sections will lay out what these protections should be.
B. Purpose of Tort Law
At the core of the debate over the collateral source rule is a theoretical argument about the purpose of tort law. Those who favor de-

71

See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based Compensation System for ProductRelated Injuries, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 669, 709 (1997) (“To the extent that victims are
compensated twice, these additional payments are passed on to the public in the form
of higher insurance costs.” (citing John L. Antracoli, Note, California’s Collateral Source
Rule and Plaintiff’s Receipt of Uninsured Motorist Benefits, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 667, 671 (1986)));
Victor E. Schwartz, Essay, Tort Law Reform: Strict Liability and the Collateral Source Rule Do
Not Mix, 39 VAND. L. REV. 569, 573-74 (1986) (“When the tort system distributes a previously compensated-for risk, it, in effect, redistributes the risk to a different insurance system. This redistribution makes poor economic sense . . . . [I]t is far easier to return premium dollars to injured parties through accident and health insurance.”).
72
Whether or not these reforms have a meaningful effect on cutting the costs of
litigation, the number of suits brought, or premium prices is subject to wide debate. See,
e.g., Alexee Deep Conroy, Lessons Learned from the “Laboratories of Democracy”: A Critique of
Federal Medical Liability Reform, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1185-86 (2006) (citing studies
that present varied conclusions on the effect of repealing the collateral source rule).
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73

terrence are more likely to sympathize with the application of the
74
collateral source rule, while those who favor a compensatory ap75
76
proach seek the rule’s limitation.
When a state limits the collateral source rule, it supports the view
that the primary purpose of the tort system is to compensate a victim
77
for his loss. At first glance, the total abrogation of the collateral
source rule would seem to advance this purpose, so that juries may
78
award economic damages based solely upon the claimant’s demon79
stration of uncompensated loss. However, some proponents of the
compensation theory of torts agree that the collateral source rule does
play a role in allocating to the claimant the costs of obtaining insurance, attorneys’ fees, and the deductible—costs that the tortfeasor has
theoretically imposed that otherwise may not be awarded to the
80
claimant. For this reason, some states that have abrogated the collateral source rule include make-whole provisions allowing the claimant to recover some of these costs before the collateral benefits are
81
subtracted from the award.
Proponents of the compensatory theory of tort law may also take
issue with a modification of damages awards that would deny willfully
uninsured claimants the full cost of their injuries, failing to make the
claimant whole. However, perhaps this outcome is justifiable. Under
the Affordable Care Act, those who refuse to purchase insurance pay a

73

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (“[One of] the purposes for
which actions of tort are maintainable [is] . . . to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct . . . .”).
74
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
75
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (explaining that tort damages are
meant “to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms”).
76
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
77
See generally Fleming, supra note 50 (advancing the view that the tort system
should function solely to compensate claimants for their losses).
78
The claimant’s award should only be reduced for economic damages covered by
insurance, as this is the portion of the award for which double recovery is possible.
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 41, § 3.11(d).
79
Cf. IDAHO CODE ANN § 6-1606 (Supp. 2008) (“In any action for personal injury
or property damage, a judgment may be entered for the claimant only for damages
which exceed amounts received by the claimant from collateral sources . . . .”).
80
See Fleming, supra note 50, at 59 (“The Helfend court considered that the collateral source rule . . . also performed a ‘legitimate and even indispensible function’ by
compensating for the plaintiff’s attorney’s share in the recovery . . . . [A] plaintiff does
not really receive a double recovery, because he must pay his own attorney a substantial
percentage of the damages awarded.” (quoting Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist.,
465 P.2d 61, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970))).
81
See supra note 39.
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82

penalty equal to the lesser of a cash amount and the insurance premium for the lowest level of “minimum acceptable coverage,” the
83
bronze plan. Anyone who pays less than the premium for minimum
essential coverage may be enriched by the failure to purchase health
insurance. Such nonparticipants also cause a loss to the public by failing to contribute to the national insurance fund used to reduce the
84
costs of insurance for all. If the purpose of the Affordable Care Act
is to build such a fund, for which all of society pays to ensure lowerpriced coverage for those who are harmed, then limiting the collateral
source rule may be justified as a means to encourage cost spreading
and to efficiently compensate those who are harmed for their loss,
85
which would promote the goal of compensation.
From a deterrence perspective, changing the collateral source
rule would undermine its important purpose—ensuring that tortfea86
sors pay for the harm they cause. The deterrence argument against
limiting the common law collateral source rule contends that defendant tortfeasors will not be made to pay for the harm they have caused
if the claimant’s primary insurer covers his medical expenses. Proponents of deterrence would likely disagree with changes to the collateral source rule that reduce the liability of defendant tortfeasors to
uninsured claimants, unless it could be proven that this measure has
an offsetting deterrence benefit. A measure that accounts for willfully
uninsured plaintiffs in awarding damages should strike a balance be82

In 2014, this cash amount will be $95, multiplied by a cost-of-living adjustment;
in 2015, $325; and in 2016, $695. Affordable Care Act, sec. 1501(b), 10106(b)(3),
§ 5000A, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(3) (West Supp. 2011); Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), § 1002(a)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A.
83
Insurance plans meeting the “minimum essential coverage” requirement are
placed into four categories specifying levels of coverage: bronze, silver, gold, and platinum. Affordable Care Act § 1302(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(d)(1). The calculation
of the penalty amount is based on a comparison between the cash amount and premiums for a bronze level plan. Id. sec. 1501(b), 10106(b)(2), § 5000A(c), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 5000A(c)(1)(B); HCERA § 1002, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(1)(B).
84
As the theory behind the Affordable Care Act is to decrease insurance premiums for individuals and small groups by grouping people together, a willful nonparticipant theoretically causes a societal loss as well. See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum, A “Broader
Regulatory Scheme”—The Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1881, 1881-82 (2010) (explaining the centrality of the individual mandate to the Affordable Care Act’s objective of fighting the adverse selection problem by inserting
healthy individuals into the insurance pool to stabilize costs).
85
For an overview of the theory and justifications behind cost spreading, see Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,
517-19 (1961).
86
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.14 (3d ed. 1986);
SHAVELL, supra note 42, at 21-32 (1987); Calabresi, supra note 85, at 502.
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tween deterring individuals from shirking their responsibilities under
87
the individual mandate and upholding fair and reasonable awards
for claimants through both the make-whole rule and subrogation for
insurers. The result would be that tortfeasors still pay for their behavior.
Under a system without the collateral source rule, the tortfeasor’s
liability may be reduced to reflect the economic damages paid by the
claimant’s insurer, but the tortfeasor will still be responsible for non88
economic damages and expenses not paid by insurance. In practice,
however, although the tortfeasor is theoretically liable for damages
awarded to the claimant, more frequently the defendant’s liability in89
surance covers them. This insurance payment strips the defendant
of most of the responsibility for paying the claimant’s damages, with
the exception of damages awarded beyond the defendant’s coverage,
90
the defendant’s deductible, and consequently higher premiums.
Eliminating the collateral source rule for insured claimants also
creates a problem from a deterrence perspective, as a system that deducts collateral source payments from damages awards fails to hold
the defendant responsible for the full extent of the harm he caused.
To mitigate this problem, I analyze a damages award regime that
promotes subrogation. Allowing for subrogation ensures that the defendant tortfeasor is liable for the amount otherwise subtracted from
the claimant’s award. Promoting subrogation for insured claimants,
91
discussed below, may help to ease the tension between the compensatory and deterrence justifications for retaining and changing the
collateral source rule.
C. The Collateral Source Rule as a Rule of Damages
Versus a Rule of Evidence
A proposal to modify the collateral source rule to align with the
Affordable Care Act’s goals must address the collateral source rule’s
87

See supra text accompanying notes 61 and 63.
See supra note 78.
89
See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 50, at 59; cf. Steven W. Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On
the Demand for Liability Insurance: An Insurance Economics Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1681, 1688 (1994) (“[I]nsurance reduces the incentives of the insured and potential
victims to avoid accidents.”).
90
See Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 313, 316-17 (1990) (detailing the ways in which covered defendants
may still be responsible for out-of-pocket payments for a claimant’s damages if the
damages exceed a predetermined cap).
91
See infra Section IV.D.
88

LEVENSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

Allocating the Costs of Harm

2/15/2012 7:11 PM

941

role as both a rule of evidence and a rule of damages. Some states
have abrogated the collateral source rule as a rule of evidence, allowing defendant tortfeasors to present evidence of the claimant’s insur92
ance coverage or lack thereof to the jury. However, even in states
that have made this change, it is unclear how a jury charged with de93
ciding a defendant’s liability should consider insurance information.
Jurors who have complied with their obligation to purchase insurance
likely will be prejudiced against a claimant who failed to obtain insur94
ance. This prejudice may cause willfully uninsured claimants to recover much less in damages than is reasonable—less than the claimant
would have received without the collateral source rule had he been
insured. The purpose of changing the collateral source rule after the
Affordable Care Act should not be to deny all damages to willfully uninsured claimants, but to align the rule’s outcome with the underlying
goal of the individual mandate: to facilitate spreading the costs of injury and illness, and not to compensate an individual for medical coverage he refused to obtain in violation of the Affordable Care Act.
In addition, because all willfully uninsured claimants are equally
at fault for their failure to purchase minimum essential coverage, it
would be unjust to hinge the claimant’s award on the jury’s prejudice
against a claimant’s failure to obtain insurance. For these reasons, the
modifications to the collateral source rule proposed here leave the
rule’s evidentiary function intact.
Introducing insurance evidence after the verdict does not create
the same subjectivity and prejudice as during trial. In many states,
judges are charged with reducing the award post-verdict based on evidence of collateral source benefits paid to the claimant that is pre95
There are at least three benefits to reducing
sented after trial.
awards during the damages phase of the trial. First, evidence of collateral payments or the lack thereof does not have the same relevance
problem post-trial as it does during the trial. Second, the modifica92

See supra note 22.
Cf. Killian v. Melser, 792 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (noting that putting insurance evidence to the jury was “irrelevant and prejudicial . . . having nothing
whatsoever to do with the true calculation of the possible recoverable damages”).
94
See, e.g., Danielle A. Daigle, Commentary, The Collateral Source Rule in Alabama: A
Practical Approach to Future Application of the Statutes Abrogating the Doctrine, 53 ALA. L.
REV. 1249, 1257-58 (2002) (observing that federal district courts in Alabama have
reached differing decisions as to how to use collateral evidence because of jurors’ likely
prejudice).
95
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308(3) (2007) (describing the process for reducing the claimant’s award by the amount of the collateral source payments received).
93
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tion of the collateral source rule’s damages function may be much less
unpredictable than total abrogation because judges can make objective deductions instead of juries making subjective calculations.
Third, the rule prevents possible prejudice against claimants based on
their lack of insurance coverage. However, such a rule would have to
protect not only the willfully uninsured claimant from jury prejudice.
Two other groups—insured claimants subject to subrogation agreements and uninsured claimants exempt from obtaining insurance—
must be considered in order to construct a damages rule that fairly allocates awards.
D. Subrogation
Commentators often acknowledge that the collateral source rule
would be easily reconcilable with a compensatory theory of torts if it
96
consistently supported subrogation, a contractual arrangement
through which a claimant’s primary insurer is reimbursed for its coverage of the claimant’s medical costs if the claimant recovers these
97
costs from the tortfeasor. Subrogation benefits both the insurers and
the insureds: insurers receive reimbursement for medical costs they
cover when their insureds are victims of a tort, and insureds who opt
98
into subrogation arrangements can benefit from lower premiums.
Decreasing premiums by way of subrogation agreements furthers
the policy of the Affordable Care Act by driving down insurance costs.
In fact, health plans using federal money to provide individual health
insurance must pursue subrogation from liable third parties by “all
99
reasonable measures.”
States considering changes to their collateral source rules as well
as states that have changed the rule already should consider the benefits of subrogation. However, subrogation poses two problems that

96

Subrogation often follows twin ideals: (1) a tortfeasor does not benefit from a
collateral source while the plaintiff is not overcompensated, and (2) the plaintiff does
not receive a windfall because of the obligation to reimburse the collateral source. See
Fleming, supra note 50, at 57-58.
97
See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 41, § 3.10(a)(1). The claimant’s insurer can
also recover these costs in an action against the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s insurer.
98
Individuals will prefer insurance contracts with subrogation agreements because
they will prefer lower-cost full coverage plans to plans that cost more for the exclusion
of a subrogation right, and because individuals seeking to profit from arrangements
without subrogation obligations can drive up premiums for plans with subrogation
rights. See SHAVELL, supra note 42, at 236-37.
99
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (2006).
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100

limit the efficacy of the arrangement. The first problem is the cost
101
for insurance providers to exercise their subrogation rights. Yet in102
surance companies often succeed in their subrogation claims, illustrating that while costs of subrogation may be high, they are not prohibitive. While policymakers may consider increasing the efficiency of
the suit for subrogation, the problem by itself does not merit a change
103
in the collateral source rule.
More seriously, subrogation affects an insured claimant’s award, a
problem that should prompt a revision of the collateral source rule.
In some personal injury actions, successful claimants may find that
their awards are small after insurance setoffs to cover the costs of ob104
taining insurance, attorneys’ fees, and noneconomic damages.
Some claimants, after cooperating with a subrogation agreement, may

100

First, while subrogation has been credited with making lower premiums possible, the fact that insurance companies receive refunds pursuant to subrogation contracts does not always result in the reduction of costs and premiums. Though many
individuals are given the choice of lower premiums in exchange for a subrogation
agreement, these lower premiums may not reflect the true extent of insurance company savings. Second, subrogation may present a problem for third-party liability insurance premiums, which may increase as a result of larger awards to claimants that are in
part subrogated to the first-party insurer. For this reason, some state collateral source
statutes limit subrogation in certain circumstances. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-565(C) (Supp. 2008). Decreasing awards for willfully uninsured claimants and
insured claimants without subrogation agreements may not fully offset the increased
costs from newly insured claimants with subrogation agreements. However, this outcome is still preferable to the current system because it allocates the payment for harm
to the tortfeasor, as opposed to the claimant’s insurer. Rather than resulting in the
tortfeasor paying full damages directly, this situation may cause him to pay indirectly in
the form of increased liability insurance premiums.
101
See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE
FROM THE STATES 6 n.15 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/
doc5549/Report.pdf (explaining that many insurers do not exercise their rights to
subrogation because “it can be difficult to establish that a certain award covers the
same damages as the injury covered by an insurance benefit,” because of the substantial administrative costs involved in obtaining awards, and because of possible “ill will
among customers”).
102
See, e.g., DeHerrera v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 219 P.3d 346, 350 (Colo. App.
2009) (holding that the insurer had a right of subrogation for payments it made to the
insured’s medical providers); Estate of Risk v. Risk, 771 N.W.2d 653 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009)
(unpublished table decision) (holding that a workers’ compensation insurance company
had a subrogation right to benefits paid to a widow for her husband’s injuries).
103
Evaluating the extent of this problem is difficult; most authors writing about
the subject do not show the rate at which insurers exercise their subrogation rights following successful personal injury suits.
104
See, e.g., Michelle Andrews, Adding Insult to Injury, SMARTMONEY, July 1, 2000, at
130 (highlighting stories of severely injured claimants whose pain and suffering damages were significantly reduced for subrogation costs).
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not have the funds to cover the costs of obtaining the subrogated
damages. This lack of funds has contributed to the development of
setoff rules, which limit how awards are reduced post-verdict. One of
these setoff options, the make-whole rule, ensures that a claimant’s
award is not reduced for collateral benefits before the claimant recov105
ers some of the costs of procuring the collateral benefit. The makewhole rule can limit the burden of a subrogation obligation because it
can restrict an insurer’s exercise of subrogation rights until the claim106
ant has been fully compensated for losses the insurer did not cover.
Although the make-whole rule does not guarantee full compensation
107
for the plaintiff’s costs, it aims to ensure that the claimant does not
108
lose more than he gains from the suit. The rule takes into account
the real costs of personal injury litigation: attorneys’ fees, costs of ob109
taining insurance, and so on.
110
While some courts have adopted the make-whole rule, a number
of states have statutory provisions that prioritize compensation of the
plaintiff’s costs of obtaining the judgment over both deductions for
111
For example, the
the defendant and for the plaintiff’s insurer.
Connecticut collateral source statute requires that the court reduce
105

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 2009) (“[T]he court shall reduce
the . . . award by the . . . amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant
. . . from all collateral sources. . . . Such reduction shall be offset to the extent of any
amount which has been paid . . . [by] the claimant . . . to secure [the] right to any collateral source benefit which the claimant is receiving as a result of her or his injury.”).
106
See Barnes v. Indep. Auto. Dealers of Cal., 64 F.3d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“It is a general equitable principle of insurance law that, absent an agreement to the
contrary, an insurance company may not enforce a right to subrogation until the insured has been fully compensated for her injuries, that is, has been made whole.”).
107
Most make-whole provisions account for the cost of obtaining the collateral
source benefit but do not necessarily account for attorneys’ fees, although these fees
are sometimes considered unofficially.
108
See Roger M. Baron, Subrogation: A Pandora’s Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L.
REV. 237, 249-52 (1996) (explaining the make-whole doctrine as a means of easing the
effect of subrogation on claimants); see also David M. Kono, Note & Comment, Unraveling the Lining of ERISA Health Insurer Pockets—A Vote for National Federal Common Law
Adoption of the Make Whole Doctrine, 2000 BYU L. REV. 427, 449-50 (analyzing the doctrine in light of ERISA concerns).
109
In a post–Affordable Care Act regime, the cost of obtaining insurance should
not be taken into account because the individual mandate requires that everyone obtain insurance coverage. The costs of a deductible, however, should be considered.
110
See, e.g., Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W. 2d 348, 355-56
(Wisc. 1982); cf. Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1993)
(evaluating, without deciding, whether the make-whole rule should be applied in federal court).
111
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 2009) (declaring no reduction of
award for collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists).
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the award by the amount of benefits the claimant received from col112
lateral sources.
However, the statute specifies that the amount the
claimant has paid to secure insurance will be removed from the reduction, therefore ensuring that the claimant is adequately reim113
bursed for the costs of insurance.
A second and less common means of easing the effects of subrogation is the common fund. The common fund requires that where a
party to litigation receives an award, others sharing the award must
bear a portion of the cost of obtaining it, including a reasonable
114
amount of attorneys’ fees.
In the context of insurance contracts,
some courts require this kind of fee-sharing for insurers that do not
exercise their rights to intervene or join with the claimant in personal
115
injury cases but stand to gain from a claimant’s recovery in the
116
This equitable form of recovery allows claimants to be comcase.
pensated for harms not covered by collateral benefits without losing
117
The common
the entire award to attorneys’ fees and subrogation.
fund is also credited with increasing efficiency in the long run. The
fund encourages cost sharing between the claimant and the insurer,
whether by means of mounting a joint case, or by sharing the cost of
118
attorneys’ fees in a successful case.

112

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a(a) (West Supp. 2009).
Id.
114
See Johnny Parker, The Common Fund Doctrine: Coming of Age in the Law of Insurance Subrogation, 31 IND. L. REV. 313, 321 (1998) (quoting Means v. Montana Power
Co., 625 P.2d 32, 37 (Mont. 1981), which described the purpose of the common fund
doctrine as avoiding unjust enrichment).
115
See id. at 328 (explaining the options available to an insurer with claims against
a tortfeasor).
116
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d
398, 402 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that without the common fund the claimant
would be in a worse position after her settlement than if she had not brought suit). In
Mathews v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., the court held:
113

[W]here [the insured’s attorney] effects a recovery it is only fair that the insurance company pay a reasonable attorney fee on its part of the recovery.
How in the name of fairness can it be said that the injured should pay a fee
not only on his recovery but also on the recovery of the insurance company?
690 F. Supp. 984, 987 (M.D. Ala. 1988. See also Eiland v. Meherin, 854 So.2d 1134,
1137 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (following Mathews to avoid a “manifestly unjust result”).
117
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 213 F.3d at 402 (explaining an insurance plan in which
the common fund rule allowed the claimant to recover damages not explicitly covered
by the plan).
118
Cf. id. (concluding that attorneys’ fees would likely make existing plans worse
in the long run).
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A system with a limited collateral source rule needs strict set-off
rules such as the make-whole rule or the common-fund rule if the goal
is to ensure that victims have incentives to seek damages for their losses. An updated statute would need to ensure that claimants bringing
successful claims would not be worse off than they would have been
119
had they not brought suit at all. In cases with a jury unsympathetic
to reimbursing an insurance company, juries may award the claimant
120
less than full economic damages.
This outcome is especially likely
where a claimant sues a sympathetic defendant or where his award is
121
A collateral source statute,
reduced for comparative negligence.
particularly one that limits the rule, should incorporate some safeguards for claimants obligated to subrogate a portion of their damages. Such safeguards are also beneficial to insurance companies that
would have to spend their own resources to recover the insured’s collateral payments if the insured had no incentive to sue for damages.
No state collateral source statutes currently adopt the common fund
doctrine, which courts enforce as a rule of equity. As stated above,
though, some states do adopt rules that incorporate the make-whole
122
rule. The make-whole rule may be more effective as a direct and efficient way for the court to protect the claimant’s award, as opposed to
the common fund rule, which requires the court to collaborate with
the insurer to ensure the payment of the insurer’s portion of the costs
of the suit.
In addition, many states with modified collateral source rules
make special provisions for individuals whose insurance coverage in123
cludes a subrogation agreement. While some states allow for the introduction of evidence regarding a claimant’s subrogation agreements
to counter the defense’s introduction of evidence of the claimant’s
124
collateral benefits, others have limited the rule to preserve collat119

See, e.g., id. at 402 (ruling that a system that leaves the claimant worse off than
had she not sued would “gratuitously deter the exercise of the tort rights”).
120
See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 41, § 3.10(c) (explaining jury members’ possible prejudice against insurance companies trying to recover the cost of providing collateral benefits to an injured party from a tortfeasor).
121
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 213 F.3d at 404 (reducing claimant’s award by twentyfive percent for comparative negligence).
122
See, e.g., supra notes 111-12.
123
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-545(c) (LexisNexis 2005) (“Upon proof by the plaintiff to the court that the plaintiff is obligated to repay the medical or hospital expenses
which have been or will be paid or reimbursed, evidence relating to such reimbursement or payment shall be admissible.”).
124
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225(a) (West Supp. 2009) (allowing for
post-verdict reduction of damages by the amount the claimant received from collateral
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eral-source-rule protection for sources with a subrogation right. Ostensibly, states have adopted this standard out of concern that claimants who have received collateral benefits may be less likely to receive
full awards from juries, even if they present evidence of their subroga126
tion obligations. For this reason, some claimants may prefer to hide
all evidence of their insurance coverage from the jury. Conversely, in
states where claimants may present evidence of subrogation obligations to counter evidence of collateral benefits, the jury may determine more accurately the amount of money the claimant will receive
127
from the suit and the award needed to make the claimant whole. In
a world after the Affordable Care Act, where juries will likely presume
that claimants are insured, claimants should be able to decide for
themselves whether information regarding subrogation agreements is
beneficial or harmful. Specifically, claimants should be able to determine whether the jury is more likely to award full damages if it
knows that the claimant is insured but obligated to repay the insurer,
or if it does not know whether the claimant is insured. Once the court
has decided that a valid subrogation right exists, the choice of whether or not to inform the jury of the collateral benefit should be the
claimant’s. Retaining the collateral source rule for claimants with
subrogation obligations aligns with the interest of insurers. Claimants
are likely to choose the course that yields awards from which they can
benefit, a choice from which the insurer will benefit as well, allowing
for compensation, deterrence, and perhaps lower premiums.
E. Exemptions
Aside from claimants legally bound to subrogation agreements
with their insurers, other groups may be unfairly affected by modifications to the collateral source rule. A collateral source statute should

sources except where “a right of subrogation exists”); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21205(2) (West Supp. 2009) (“Such reduction shall not apply to the extent that there is a
right of recoupment through subrogation . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (same).
125
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (2008) (“[A] defendant may introduce evidence of amounts received or to be received by the claimant as compensation for the
same injury from collateral sources that do not have a right of subrogation by law or
contract.”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545 (McKinney Supp. 2011) (“[E]vidence shall be admissible for consideration by the court to establish that any such past or future cost or expense was or will, with reasonable certainty, be replaced or indemnified . . . from any
collateral source . . . .”).
126
See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 41, § 3.10(c) (discussing the possibility of juror prejudice against insurance companies).
127
See Pitts, supra note 41, at 769-70.
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take into account individuals exempt from the requirement to obtain
128
health insurance under the Affordable Care Act. The statute specifies a number of exempt groups, including individuals who cannot af129
ford health coverage. These exempt groups should not be exposed
to jury criticism or given reduced awards for not obtaining coverage.
For some in these groups, lawsuits may be the only means by which
they can pay for their medical costs, as opposed to willfully uninsured
individuals, who are able to obtain health insurance but refuse to do
130
so. For these reasons, like individuals whose insurance contracts reserve subrogation rights, exempt individuals should have the discretion to determine whether evidence of their uninsured status should
be revealed to the factfinder.
V. PROPOSING MODIFICATIONS TO THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
Accounting for the numerous issues raised by changing the rule, I
propose below a model statute for changing the common law collat131
eral source rule—based both on preexisting state statutes amending
the rule and on new policy objectives that the Affordable Care Act
raises. This Part first lays out the objectives that this new regime is
meant to achieve. It then provides language for a model damages
statute modifying the collateral source rule and adding an additional
damages rule to account for the uninsured plaintiff. Finally, it addresses some of the criticisms that may be raised against the proposal.
A. Objectives of Modifying the Collateral Source Rule
Any changes modifying the collateral source rule after the Affordable Care Act must account for the different groups affected. This
Section identifies these groups and explains the proposed statute’s
treatment of them, as well as the motivation for this treatment.

128

See supra note 62.
Cf. Affordable Care Act sec. 1501(b), § 5000A(e), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e) (West
Supp. 2011) (listing individuals who cannot afford health coverage as the first exempt
group).
130
In some cases, willfully uninsured claimants pay the equivalent of a bronze plan
premium and simply refuse the coverage that comes with it. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
131
Though many state statutes pertaining to collateral sources address both tort
and contract actions, this statute is meant to address only personal injury actions.
129
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1. The Willfully Uninsured Claimant
If the purpose of the collateral source rule, and of tort law more
generally, is to proportionately allocate the costs of harm to the individuals who cause it, then it is reasonable to hold a claimant partially
responsible for shirking his responsibility to mitigate the costs of this
harm by purchasing insurance. The Affordable Care Act fundamentally changed the incentives surrounding the purchase of medical insurance by imposing the individual mandate, and the collateral source
rule should be updated to align with an individual’s new responsibility
to obtain coverage.
For this reason, the model statute proposed here would introduce
a new damages rule to supplement the changes proposed to the collateral source rule below. The new statute would require the subtraction of the amount of medical costs that would have been covered under a bronze plan, the minimum coverage plan acceptable under the
Affordable Care Act, from damages awarded to willfully uninsured
plaintiffs. The bronze plan is the only justifiable plan to use as a measure because using a more expensive plan would punish uninsured
plaintiffs for not obtaining coverage they were not obligated to buy.
To protect willfully uninsured claimants from the reduction of damages that would not have been covered under a bronze plan, the model
statute incorporates a version of the make-whole rule. This proposed
statute would ensure that the awards for willfully uninsured claimants
are not unjustly reduced and that these claimants do not unjustly benefit from damages that should be covered by an insurance plan.
2. The Insured Claimant
The Affordable Care Act’s passage has also weakened some of the
justifications for upholding the collateral source rule for insured
claimants. Although there is still a deterrence justification for holding
the tortfeasor responsible for the full cost of his harm, it now makes
little sense to preserve a rule meant in part to protect or reward insured claimants when obtaining insurance is mandatory. In light of
the proposal for reducing the awards of willfully uninsured claimants,
it is only equitable that the damages rule for uninsured claimants be
the same for insured claimants. Therefore, under the model collateral source rule proposed below, the court must reduce the insured
claimant’s award post-verdict to reflect the amount paid by the collateral source—except in the case of claimants with subrogation obligations. For these claimants, no portion of the award subject to a subro-
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gation agreement may be reduced from the claimant’s award. Fur132
thermore, because of the unique difficulties posed by subrogation,
the proposed rule contains both a make-whole provision and the opportunity for claimants subject to subrogation agreements to present
evidence of this obligation to the jury. The make-whole provision, in
particular, is meant to ensure that the claimant is adequately compensated. In addition, the actual cost of collateral benefits—and not the
reasonable cost of medical care—is deducted from the award, leaving
room for the additional coverage of the insured claimant’s costs, since
the jury will still be asked to award the reasonable cost of care. The
provisions for insured claimants reflect limitations on the damages
portion of the collateral source rule that are currently in place in a
133
majority of states.
3. The Claimant Exempt from Purchasing Insurance
Because the claimant exempt from purchasing insurance may
have no other means of covering his medical costs, he is exempt from
the provision in the proposed statute that reduces the award of a willfully uninsured plaintiff. Like the claimant subject to a subrogation
agreement, the exempt claimant should also have the option to share
this fact with the jury, if he so chooses. Since the uninsured claimant
receives no collateral benefits, no reductions are made from his award.
B. Model Statute for the Introduction of Evidence
Pertaining to Collateral Sources
(a) In all tort actions for which economic damages for personal
injury are claimed and are legally recoverable, information pertaining
to whether the claimant has been or will be paid or reimbursed by a
third party is not admissible, except that information relating to the
payment of collateral benefits or the lack thereof may be introduced
by the claimant if:
(1) the court determines that the claimant has an obligation
to repay the expenses which have been or will be paid or reimbursed; or
(2) the court determines that the claimant is exempt from obtaining insurance under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d) or (e).

132
133

See supra Section IV.D.
See statutes cited supra notes 21-22.
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(b) The trial judge shall deduct from the verdict the amount of
nonsubrogated collateral benefit paid to the claimant by a third party,
less the total amount determined to be paid, contributed, or forfeited
by the claimant to obtain reimbursement or payment of medical or
hospital expenses.
(c) After the finder of fact has returned its verdict, the defendant
may produce evidence that the claimant failed to obtain minimum essential insurance coverage under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b), but was not
exempt from purchasing insurance under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d) or
(e). If the court so finds, it shall reduce the damages to be awarded
by the amount that would have been reimbursed to him by the lowest
level of minimum essential coverage accepted under 42 U.S.C.
§ 18022(d)(1), “the bronze plan,” except that:
(1) this amount may be deducted only to the extent that the
verdict exceeds the amount of the claimant’s damages that
would not be covered by the bronze plan; and
(2) the claimant is not entitled to the costs of any penalty
paid under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) for failure to obtain insurance coverage.
C. Effect of the Model Statute
This model statute may be criticized by those who argue that holding willfully uninsured claimants responsible for their failure to purchase mandatory health insurance accomplishes neither the compensatory nor the deterrent function of tort law. The rule offered above
does not fully compensate the willfully uninsured claimant for his injury, nor does it impose the full cost of harm on the tortfeasor.
However, this model statute aims to achieve compensation and
deterrence more broadly. In failing to obtain the mandatory insurance, the willfully uninsured claimant causes a loss to society by failing
to take part in a system that promotes loss compensation at a low price
to individuals. In this sense, the willfully uninsured plaintiff is held
responsible for the portion of the loss he could have covered, just as a
134
claimant’s award can be deducted for comparative negligence.
In
this way, and by exempting uninsured plaintiffs who are not required
to purchase health insurance under the Affordable Care Act, the pro134

See, e.g., Cockerline v. Menendez, 988 A.2d 575, 588 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010) (“[The] comparative fault system is intended to ensure ‘the distribution of
loss in proportion to the respective faults of the parties causing that loss.’” (quoting
Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 853 A.2d 940, 947 (N.J. 2004))).
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posed statute attempts to achieve the equitable result. This proposal
would also affect settlement negotiations by lowering the willfully uninsured claimant’s expectation of the damages he could receive from
a trial.
Similarly, a deterrence perspective can justify this revised rule.
Now that obtaining insurance coverage is mandatory, this rule imposes costs on both parties at fault in a suit—the tortfeasor and the willfully uninsured claimant. To ensure that the tortfeasor still pays a
portion of the damages, the only costs imposed on the claimant are
those that otherwise would have been covered by the lowest level insurance plan, and the successful claimant is guaranteed recovery of his
other costs before his damages are reduced.
Supporters of the common law collateral source rule may raise arguments from the traditional debate: that the common law rule protects insured claimants and that this particular statute undermines the
deterrence function of the collateral source rule. However, with the
135
significant majority of Americans insured, the rule will not protect
claimants from jury assumptions. Collateral source rule supporters
also may argue that a statute that reduces damages undermines the
deterrence achieved from the tortfeasor’s payment of full damages.
However, many states have already adopted this kind of reduction to
combat rising insurance costs and the increased use of liability insur136
ance. The model statute attempts to maintain a level of deterrence
by allowing insured claimants to continue to receive write-offs and encouraging subrogation. In addition, the model statute’s primary
aim—to allocate the costs of harm fairly in light of the Affordable
Care Act—functions as a deterrent for those claimants who may otherwise choose to ignore their obligation to purchase insurance.
CONCLUSION
Although the passage of the Affordable Care Act will not resolve
the collateral source rule debate, it has the potential to galvanize
states and the federal government to reevaluate their collateral source
rule statutes by introducing a new factor to be considered in the debate: the willfully uninsured claimant. By evaluating how the debate
over the collateral source rule has changed, perhaps a new consensus
can be achieved in terms of resolving some of the differences among
states that have limited the rule. The model statute presented here is
135
136

See supra note 66.
See supra note 21.
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not the only solution to the issue; however, it strives to achieve an equitable result in a society in which insurance coverage is mandated. A
full repeal of the rule will not achieve this result, but an evaluation of
which claimants the rule should be protecting may allow for its proper
limitation and a more standardized approach to the way in which the
rule is used across the states.

